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Challenges for CivilMilitary Relations

The Walter Reed Scandal and
the All-Volunteer Force
Richard G. Malish
ABSTRACT: This article describes the Walter Reed scandal of 2007
and what it tells us about the relationship of America to its allvolunteer force. It then offers suggestions for leadership strategies
to monitor the relationship to avoid future surprises.

I

n February 2007, as 20,000 US troops surged into Iraq to stabilize
an insurgency and curb an emerging civil war, the Washington Post
published a series of articles describing shameful conditions at Walter
Reed Army Medical Center, the United States Army’s flagship hospital
and main hub for receiving soldiers evacuated from hostilities overseas.
The articles depicted a system that provided state-of-the-art medical
care, but which had broken down in multiple ways. Physical conditions in
some of the barracks were squalid; clear signs of neglect such as “mouse
droppings, belly-up cockroaches, stained carpets, [and] cheap mattresses”
were found in some buildings.1 Outpatient soldiers were neglected,
“chewed out by superiors,” treated with “petty condescension,” and
required to navigate a “bureaucratic maze” to receive basic treatment
and benefits.2
Public reactions of fury and outrage were immediately expressed in
congressional hearings, media reports, and opinion pieces.3 Interest in
the scandal was intense with “more than three-in-ten Americans (31%)
[paying] very close attention.” 4 In 2007 and 2008, the Pew Research
Center reported a “highly critical” public; 72 percent of respondents said
“the government [did] not give enough support to soldiers who have
served in Iraq and Afghanistan.” 5
It was unclear how such neglect could happen—at Walter Reed
of all places—and how America’s heroes could be so mistreated. The
public struggled to understand how the leadership at Walter Reed was
not aware of the conditions, or worse, thought they were acceptable. The
Post articles may have focused on a single hospital, but they touched on
an extensive system and seemingly widespread attitudes. Consequently,
1      Dana Priest and Anne Hull, “Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration at Army’s Top Medical
Facility,” Washington Post, February 18, 2007.
2      Priest and Hull, “Soldiers Face Neglect”; and Guy Raz, “Pentagon Tackles Criticism of
Military Hospital,” NPR, February 23, 2007.
3      David Stout, “General Steps Down in Walter Reed Furor,” New York Times, March 12, 2007;
Johanna Neuman and Adam Schreck, “Outrage and Apologies over Care at Walter Reed,” Los Angeles
Times, March 6, 2007; and “The Wider Shame of Walter Reed,” New York Times, March 7, 2007.
4      “Public Tunes In to Walter Reed Story,” Pew Research Center, March 15, 2007.
5     “Public Continues To Fault Government for Troop Care,” Pew Research Center, March 19, 2008.
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the implications were far-reaching. Government and senior military
leaders stood accused of being insensitive to the needs of those asked to
sacrifice so much for the nation.
This article suggests the events at Walter Reed illustrate how
extraordinary public esteem for America’s modern all-volunteer force
(AVF) might place unexpected constraints on its use. In the years leading
up to the scandal, public adulation of the military created a significant
yet unexposed gap in perceptions between wounded soldiers and the
establishment that managed them. Walter Reed’s leaders did not realize
they were dealing with a clientele whose relationship with the public
differed from their own.
This blind spot existed for many reasons, including the hospital
staff’s familiarity with the AVF, which obscured its ability to perceive
the military through the public’s lens. This perception, influenced by
myth and crafted by tact, is now beginning to reach a design that is
decades-old. The public had moved faster to accept a special status for
its military than had the US government.
A victim of its success, the government now faces repercussions of
broader significance. Because of the differences of perception between
soldiers and their caretaking establishment, the public may increasingly
intervene to protect and to safeguard its military. The result may place
constraints upon the nation’s use of its military as an instrument of
national power.

The All-Volunteer Force

Soldiers who received care in Walter Reed from 2002 to 2007 had a
different relationship with the public than servicemembers at any other
time in American history. A 2011 Pew poll found that 90 percent of
Americans “felt proud of the soldiers serving in the military” during
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.6 The force was commonly described
as “heroic.” 7 In fact, positive public support for the military continues
to be so pervasive that it is hard to remember or to justify any other
paradigm. Nevertheless, history demonstrates considerable variation
in the relationship between the public and the military. As recently as
the Vietnam War, the military was the object of the American public’s
“ire.” 8 Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz used his famous trinity to
indicate that war and its features of reason, chance, and passion make
the relationship between soldier, people, and government unbalanced,
unpredictable, and subject to change.9 The current relationship between
the American people and its military is, generationally speaking, new
and evolving.
6      “War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era: Executive Summary,” Pew Research Center,
October 5, 2011.
7      Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Vintage Books, 2015), 135.
8             LTG Eric B. Schoomaker (USA Retired) (42nd surgeon general of the Army; former
commanding general US Army Medical Command), interview with the author, April 6, 2018.
9      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976).
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Members of today’s AVF are unknown to the vast majority of
Americans. In spite of conducting combat operations in two theaters,
the US military is the smallest since the 1930s.10 In the Second World
War, roughly 50 percent of males between the ages of 18 and 49 served;
however, today “less than 0.5 percent of the population serves in the
armed forces.” 11 Hence, few Americans have personal connections to
the military. Anonymity is important because it provides a blank slate
upon which to superimpose one’s personal judgements of agency and
motivation. As author James Wright states, “If we have no personal
relationships with those who are fighting our wars, then we think of
war as a geopolitical drama, and we think of those fighting it as heroic
action figures.” 12 Essayist and critic William Deresiewicz, elaborates
on the lack of personal familiarity with members of the military as an
important factor of modern-day military hero worship:
The greater the sacrifice that has fallen . . . the members of the military and
their families, the more we have gone from supporting our troops to putting
them on a pedestal. In the Second World War, everybody fought. Soldiers
were not remote figures to most of us; they were us. Now, instead of sharing
the burden, we sentimentalize it. It’s a lot easier to idealize the people who
are fighting than it is to send your kid to join them.13

These observations are useful for reasons other than illustrating the
impact of anonymity. They acknowledge the agency, or actions, of the
uniformed services at war: the military fights and sacrifices to the benefit
of national interests. The public is thankful because it understands the
military shoulders the weight of society’s physically and psychically
injurious work. In 2011, eighty-three percent of those polled quantified
the sacrifice as “a lot.” 14 Indeed, patients at Walter Reed during this
period had made enormous, and in many cases permanent, sacrifices
while serving.
Finally, and most importantly, the volunteer paradigm facilitates
the widespread public perception of altruism in the military. Willingly
sacrificing comfort to address community-afflicting problems that
normal institutions have failed to solve, the AVF conveys motivations
that harmonize with repeated and reinforced narratives of superheroism.
As a result, Americans worship their military. Commonly expressed
as patriotism, the designation of altruism toward the modern US allvolunteer force is so pervasive that even non-American contemporary
military historians make the connection.15

10      Jim Tice, “Army Shrinks to Smallest Level since before World War II,” Army Times,
May 7, 2016.
11      Karl W. Eikenberry and David M. Kennedy, “Americans and Their Military, Drifting Apart,”
New York Times, May 26, 2013.
12      James Wright, Those Who Have Borne the Battle: A History of America’s Wars and Those Who Fought
Them (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012), 276.
13      William Deresiewicz, “An Empty Regard,” New York Times, August 20, 2011.
14      Paul Taylor, ed., The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era (Washington,
DC: Pew Research Center, 2011), 2.
15      John Keegan, “The Making of the American GI,” Time, December 29, 2003.

18

Parameters 48(3) Autumn 2018

Without attribution of patriotic motivation, anonymous militaries
may be perceived as victims, pawns, or worse. Five years into the
Vietnam War, for example, opinion polls about the political and moral
merits of the conflict were as negative in scale as those of the Iraq War
in 2007.16 Yet, only 27 percent of the US population thought favorably
of the force conscripted to fight in Vietnam.17

The Establishment

Public adulation of the military creates a significant perception gap
between the AVF and those with the power to manage it. In regards to
Walter Reed, this includes senior officers, civilian leaders, and staff.
Because of the heroic status of Walter Reed patients, one can
understand how the public would expect the government to provide
world-class medical care and the best amenities. The Washington Post
articles, in revealing a different reality, shattered such expectations.
The public’s outrage fueled decisive and immediate action by Congress
and the secretary of defense. Within two weeks of the articles, the
establishment began to purge itself of its perceived wrongdoers.
Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey relieved Major General George
W. Weightman, Walter Reed’s senior commander. Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates endorsed the firing: “The care and welfare of our
wounded men and women in uniform depend on the highest standard
of excellence and commitment that we can muster as a government.
When this standard is not met, I will insist on direct corrective action.” 18
The “direct corrective action” did not spare Harvey, whom Gates
fired two days later.19 Shortly thereafter, Acting Secretary of the Army
Preston M. “Pete” Geren announced the retirement of Army Surgeon
General Lieutenant General Kevin C. Kiley.20 When the smoke cleared,
command of Walter Reed rested in the hands of then Major General
Eric B. Schoomaker who was charged with charting a course that was
consistent with congressional, senior leader, and public expectations.
Nonetheless, Army medicine never recovered from the damage. In 2017,
the Army role in managing hospitals was bestowed upon the newly
formed Defense Health Agency.21
As the Walter Reed scandal illustrates, the more the public ascribes
heroic motivation to its fighting class, the higher American expectations
will be for supporting, managing, and leading it and the lower the
tolerance will be for shortcomings. In contrast to that of soldiers, public
16      Jodie T. Allen, Nilanthi Samaranayake, and James Albrittain Jr., “Iraq and Vietnam: A Crucial
Difference in Opinion,” Pew Research Center, March 22, 2007.
17     Allen, Samaranayake, and Albrittain, “Iraq and Vietnam.”
18     Associated Press, “General in Charge of Walter Reed Hospital Has Been Relieved of
Command,” USA Today, March 1, 2007.
19     Chuck Callahan, Forty Days of Winter—Walter Reed and the Washington Post February–March
2007 (Washington, DC), briefing slides; and Michael Abramowitz and Steve Vogel, “Army Secretary
Ousted,” Washington Post, March 3, 2007.
20     Associated Press, “Army’s Surgeon General To Retire,” NBC News, March 12, 2007.
21     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130
Stat. 2000 (2016).
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perception of the establishment has varied little over time. It may never
reach the heroic threshold of the force it supports. And senior military
leaders forever forfeit their heroic stature when they join the ranks of the
institutions that require defending.
To discern the origin of these distinctions, it is useful to evaluate
the establishment using the same triad of factors used to understand
perceptions of the AVF: familiarity, agency, and motivation. First, the
senior military and civilian ranks are fewer in number than the mass
of the AVF. In the internet-enabled era of information, actions and
decisions are available to the public in detail never before seen. As a
result, they cannot exist anonymously and therefore cannot benefit
from the public attribution of characteristics derived from romanticized
myth. Second, while they have strategic-level capability and agency,
they neither fight nor sacrifice. Instead, they pursue the nation’s work in
conditions of comfort and safety. Most importantly, the public perceives
their motivations differently from that of the junior ranks. Congressman
Seth Moulton, a former Marine Corps officer, uses the following
language: “The highest ranks [have become populated], by careerists,
people who have gotten where they are by checking all the boxes and not
taking risks.” 22 Moreover, opinion pieces, books, blogs, academic works,
and political cartoons commonly attribute self-serving motivations and
bureaucratic behaviors to the establishment.23
Schoomaker recognized Walter Reed’s early public affairs strategy
paid little attention to the perception gap between AVF and senior
leadership.24 Even after sacking senior leaders, “we [continued to] put
general officers in front of [the media] and when we did, we exacerbated
the distance between the public and us.” 25 The ages and ranks appearing
in the media confirmed the public’s biases. Instead of seeing the heroism
previously displayed by those in the senior military ranks, the public
perceived the generals and senior leaders as self-serving bureaucrats. To
rectify this issue, Schoomaker intentionally minimized the presence of
generals and senior leaders as the face of Walter Reed in press conferences.
Differences between the stereotypes used to characterize senior
leaders and the remainder of the AVF make media accounts of
misconduct more harmful for senior leaders than junior ranks. In the
former group, the messages reinforce negative stereotypes. In the latter,
they are at such odds with the prevailing perception as to be considered
the behavior of outliers. By persisting in the profession, senior leaders
outlast the crisis for which they were called upon as saviors and expose
self-serving impetuses. In contrast, soldiers become increasingly
unassailable in respect and admiration. Because public respect for
22      James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military,” Atlantic (January/February 2015).
23      Richard Halloran, “Washington Talk: Military Careers; Air Force and Marines Battle ‘Ticket
Punchers,’ ” New York Times, April 25, 1988; and Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, “How a Careerist Culture
Leads to Military Scandals,” American Conservative, February 18, 2014.
24      For examples of contemporary political cartoons prepared by such cartoonists Pat Oliphant,
Jim Borgman, R.J. Matson, and Lyle Lahey, see Callahan, Forty Days of Winter.
25      Schoomaker, interview.
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the military has grown while opinions of its caretaking agents have
remained stagnant, the perception gap has widened.

The Boundaries

If the public regards soldiers as a heroic elite, then the medical and
support establishment must do so as well. Without such alignment,
the perception gap will result in crises of the scale and type of Walter
Reed. The factors leading to the physical, climatic, and bureaucratic
conditions in Walter Reed were complex and multidimensional. Even
so, many would argue the root cause was the simple fact that hospital
leadership and staff did not perceive their patients with the same
reverence as the public.
While the boundaries between the AVF and the establishment are
clear to the public, they are more difficult to discern from the inside.
Within Walter Reed’s walls, patients, staff, and leaders worked together
in constantly changing teams in ways that obscured the boundaries
between the establishment and the AVF.26 As a result, staff and leadership
did not understand that public adulation for the mythical soldier had
elevated patients to a status higher than the one they perceived and had
come to expect for themselves.
Factors other than physical mixing contributed to this ignorance:
Walter Reed’s staff included hundreds of soldiers such as Weightman,
who was a combat veteran that had spent his career serving with
soldiers. Many Walter Reed staffers were Operation Iraqi Freedom
veterans, and the hospital routinely and cyclically deployed its staff
to the war. The uniformed members of the staff, and many civilians,
received their care at Walter Reed, which routinely associated them with
the wounded. Members of the Walter Reed treatment team were revered
alongside the wounded in previous news features about the campus.
The unit won an Army Superior Unit award for its early work in the war.
The wounded wanted to remain in close proximity to Walter Reed even
though it was an acute, tertiary care hospital and not a rehabilitation
center.27 Proud of its medical services, the hospital respected these
wishes. Finally, Walter Reed workers developed traditional providerpatient alliances with the wounded. A division between patients and
providers in terms of goals, approach, and motivation was anathema
to their bonds. Although the system was inefficient, leaders, providers,
administrators, and patients navigated it, as best they could, together.
The Washington Post articles revealed the error in the collective
attitude at Walter Reed. Colonel Charles “Chuck” Callahan, the hospital’s
senior physician in 2007, described the impact of the articles on the
staff’s vision of reality: “The hospital staff failed [the patients]. Among
staff members [at Walter Reed], the Post’s articles evoked an incredulity
26      The author observed this dynamic as a physician at Walter Reed from September 2003–
June 2006.
27       Charles “Chuck” Callahan, “The Perfect Strom: Walter Reed, the Wounded and the
Washington Post 2007” (strategy research project, US Army War College, 2008), 1.
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shared with the American public, and when we were honest with
ourselves, we asked along with the public, ‘How did an organization that
was the most successful in history . . . break down?’ ” 28 The hospital’s
leadership recognized the shift of its public perception from highly
regarded to negligent was justified. Leaders at all levels had “failed as
systems thinkers.” 29 By choosing to accept, on a day-to-day basis, the
constraints of the system, they represented a traditional bureaucracy—
impersonal, inflexible, and accepting little accountability to change the
rigid processes.
The hospital staff mixing among, familiarizing with, and commonly
bonding with the AVF offers the beginning of an answer as to why more
efficient administrative processes were not offered to patients. A fixture
of Army life is a requirement to thrive in austere conditions. Luxury,
in the Army, was once considered “three hots (warm meals) and a cot.”
At the organizational level, leaders have waited months for pay and
administrative issues to be resolved, essential equipment to be repaired,
and key positions to be filled. Acquiring modern equipment routinely
takes decades, exceeds budgets, and falls short of promises. These flaws
create the climate of the military lifestyle. Survival in this atmosphere
requires resilience and stoicism. To be successful, leaders adopt can-do
attitudes that enable them to contend with the conditions of austerity
and scarcity experienced in combat and peace. Soldiers are conditioned
never to ask for luxury and to complain only in the guise of humor.
Schoomaker identified this tendency during the investigation
at Walter Reed: The hospital commander “had visibility of what the
problems were—but was unable to solve them . . . [for] compelling
reasons . . . I had to reprimand him not for failing to recognize what
was happening but because he did not notify higher command . . . He
was such a terrific soldier that he was unwilling to call attention to the
issues.” 30 Instead, the commander endured the resourcing deficiencies
and strove to complete the mission with what he had. Representative
Christopher H. Shays also insightfully identified this predisposition as a
cause for the conditions at Walter Reed.31
The events of Walter Reed demonstrate the public expects leaders
to overcome resourcing constraints to ensure the care, boarding,
protection, and equipping of modern warriors matches their heroic
station. According to Schoomaker, if there is a lesson to be learned from
Walter Reed, it is that leaders must fight the tendency to “drive on”
in resource-constrained environments. Instead, they must elevate the
existence of subpar physical and administrative conditions to the level
needed to assure correction.32
28      Chuck Callahan “To Stay a Soldier,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009).
29      Schoomaker, interview.
30      Schoomaker, interview.
31      CQ Transcripts Wire, “Congressional Hearing on Walter Reed Army Medical Center, House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs,” Washington Post, March 5, 2007.
32      Schoomaker, interview.
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The establishment’s physical proximity to the AVF has implications
beyond knowledge and stoic acceptance of routine working conditions.
It has insider knowledge regarding the motivations for volunteering for
military service. Unlike the public, neither the AVF nor the establishment
can reflexively accept altruism as a unifying motivation for military
service. Except in the most existential crises, patriotism alone cannot
be used as the sole incentive to raise an army of volunteers. Instead,
recruitment policies must appeal to personal interests. Such reasoning
helped create the AVF of 2007 and 2008.
As the military changed its methodology from conscription to
volunteerism in the 1970s, monetary rewards were incorporated into the
new force. In fact, the famed Noble Prize-winning, free market-capitalist,
Milton Friedman, was a key voice in the Gates Commission, which
charted the Army’s conversion from a conscripted to a volunteer force.33
As a result, military pay was made more competitive with civilian
wages, and financial incentives such as combat and hazardous duty pay
were put in place for high-risk missions or specialized skills. Additional
bonuses are offered at key decision points to retain soldiers on active
duty. Finally, the military still offers a traditional lifetime pension
plan after 20 years of service, one that has not been retained in other
professions. Unlike the public, those immersed in the AVF cannot
clearly identify where altruism ends and private interests begin. Financial
incentives destroy a member’s ability to rely upon simple heuristics to
categorize other volunteers into dichotomous groups of patriots and
careerists, heroes and villains. Senior ranks at Walter Reed did not buy
into the soldier-as-exceptional myth as completely as the public because
they lived in a more complicated reality.

The Expectations

The public’s simplified perception of the all-volunteer force did not
develop in a vacuum. To counteract potential impressions of a mercenary
force, the military has, as a matter of policy, encouraged the public to
assign paternalistic and altruistic motivations to it.34 To this day, the
military crafts its image to resemble the superheroes of mainstream
American culture. Recruiting advertisements portray servicemembers
as possessing dual identities. In combat, they are fierce warriors masked
by protective equipment and in control of marvelous futuristic machines
capable of extraordinary destruction. In peace, they are good-looking,
selfless, and patriotic in their dress uniforms.
Led by Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland, the
founders of the AVF recognized this desired image of the emerging force
required different support than that of the conscripted force. To maintain
recruitment and to shape the AVF’s public image, benefits expanded to
33      Thomas S. Gates et. al., The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force
(Washington, DC: President’s Commission, 1970).
34      Jennifer Mittelstadt, The Rise of the Military Welfare State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2015), 45.
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include health, education, and insurance programs; personal quarters;
and administrative infrastructure. These features invited the public to
imagine the AVF as a family, cared for and united by common values.
To maintain this image, the military has improved benefits over
the past 45 years to match social expectations. Even during combat in
Iraq, the establishment provided soldiers with catered meals, private
air-conditioned living quarters, and indulgences such as internet cafes.
Without any signal to suggest otherwise, the military will continue its
journey upward not only in public perception but also in ensuring its
existence meets all the conditions suitable to its elevated station. Even
so, such a transformation will require eliminating what was once the
status quo. Such change is not always predictable, smooth, or easy.
Walter Reed demonstrates at least one case in which the evolutionary
pace of providing combat matériel and services eclipsed the progress of
administrative processes on the home front.
This line of thought opens a new aperture through which to
evaluate whether the events at Walter Reed were the simple failures
of a few poor leaders or an inevitable step in the public’s effort to
ensure its force was treated appropriately. By illustrating an antiquated
and insensitive bureaucracy, Walter Reed provided the energy and
urgency needed to usher in several new programs that rapidly benefited
the nation’s wounded. The Army created warrior transition units to
manage medical transitions properly and introduced soldier and family
assistance centers to provide nonmedical support. The disability system
was reformed to reduce substantially the timelines required to process
benefits. The consequences of the disruptive changes on the existing
establishment were necessary for equalizing the public’s expectations
with the care provided to wounded servicemembers of the AVF. Walter
Reed demonstrates the success of the 1970s image for the all-volunteer
force. The modern public will support its heroic military whatever the
cost, which is an important lesson of Walter Reed and a cautionary tale
for the Defense Health Agency.

The Protection

The Somalia intervention (1992–94), the Khobar Towers bombing
(1996), and the Kosovo conflict (1998–99) provide examples of the
American public’s “excessive aversion to casualties” altering military
responses.35 With the events at Walter Reed demonstrating such feelings
have grown to an “aversion to austerity” for its military class, the
possibility that the United States will experience greater constraints
on military employment should be considered. Conversely, some claim
that the very qualities that make the AVF cherished by the public—a
willingness to fight and to sacrifice—make it more liberally employable
by the government, possibly even encouraging national adventurism.

35      Edward Dorn and Howard D. Graves, American Military Culture in the Twenty-first Century
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), 21.
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Contemporary military critic John A. Nagl states, “The American
public is completely willing to let this professional class of volunteers
serve where they should, for wise purpose. This gives the president much
greater freedom of action.” 36 Others—such as historian and international
relations professor Andrew J. Bacevich—testify the situation is more
menacing: “By rescinding their prior acceptance of conscription, the
American people effectively opted out of war.” 37 Since “they have no
skin in the game, they will permit the state to do whatever it wishes
to do.” 38 Finally, if nothing changes, “Americans can look forward to
more needless wars or shadow conflicts . . . more wars that exact huge
penalties without yielding promised outcomes.” 39
While history indicates a trend of increased American military
expeditionary intervention, no evidence supports the contention that
the public has or will become indifferent to the well-being of the AVF
in times of hardship. Such analysis is at odds with the adulation of
the military discussed previously. Indeed, the public’s reaction to the
conditions at Walter Reed disproves the hypothesis. To suggest the
government and its military could be divorced from the people would
mean Clausewitz’s elements of reason and chance could be isolated
from passion. The bonds between the military and the people are not
weakening but strengthening. Contrary to Bacevich’s claims, it is the
bonds between the military and the government that are fraying.
Underestimating the public’s power and desire to affect war is a pit
into which senior military leaders have repeatedly fallen. Public support
for military intervention varies according to the nature of the threat,
the merit and progress of the endeavor, and ultimately, its cost. This
last variable, cost—particularly human cost—is what has changed in
the era of the AVF, the age of instant information, and the period of
military heroism.
Only when the US military encounters success at little human
cost will the public remain silent. But the human costs are increasingly
visible. Furthermore, even relatively rare losses or inequities may
produce soul-touching impact in the realm of public opinion—as they
did at Walter Reed. When the internet and mainstream media deliver
stories of human injustice or tragedy, no matter how tactically or
statistically insignificant, public emotion of strategic scale may emerge.
Because superheroes are held in such high esteem, harm to them is
abhorrent. As they are killed, disfigured, or mistreated, their anonymity
is lifted, and without armor, they appear smaller, younger, ordinary,
and vulnerable. In the moment their sacrifice is realized, they instantly

36      James Fallows, “Tragedy of the American Military.”
37      Andrew J. Bacevich, “Ending Endless War: A Pragmatic Military Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95,
no. 5 (September/October 2016): 40.
38     Andrew J. Bacevich, “The New American Way of War,” London Review of Books (blog),
February 13, 2012.
39      Andrew J. Bacevich, Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country (New
York, NY: Metropolitan, 2013), 190.
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resemble our children, and it matters not whether the force volunteered
or was conscripted.
A public united to oppose the harm or discomfort affecting its
heroes will retain the power to affect the course of warfare through its
representatives in Congress. After reflexively criticizing the self-serving
character and marginal competence of military and civilian leaders, the
public will intervene to hobble the establishment’s power and limit its
autonomy with the AVF. Specifically, excessive demands may be made to
draft defensive rules of engagement, to make major changes in strategy,
to withdrawal from combat, or to fast-track protective equipment at the
cost of other acquisition programs.
In a salient example of the latter, Congress, reacting to public
outcry over the death and injury of soldiers in Iraq due to primitive
roadside explosive devices, demanded the immediate acquisition of safer
vehicles for troops. The acquisition of mine-resistant, ambush protected
vehicles occurred at a cost. Specifically, many of the military’s major
modernization efforts were abandoned, which contributed to persisting
strategic vulnerabilities. Hence, the US national security apparatus will
increasingly need to consider the public’s feelings about the AVF as too
precious to lose and too honored to harm. Otherwise, with time, the
force may only be available for threats of the most existential kind.

The Solutions

More resources need to be applied to understanding the strategic
implications of an AVF for America. Specifically, leaders should strive
to understand how to maintain and to deploy a small, anonymous, and
elite force, a force to whom the public will accord proud confidence and
protection. Ironically, the bonds between a society and its guardians
have been explored more in blockbuster movies than in serious
academic triangles.
The problem defined in this article provides a place to begin
understanding what it will mean to live in a modern America in which
a group of elites provides collective security. Because this reality will
not be easily disentangled from its DNA, its decades-old historical
foundations, and the mass impact of myth, understanding it will be
every bit as challenging as understanding future battle.
Work at the tactical and operational levels offers a logical parallel. In
the multidomain battlefield of the future, the ability to collect information
and act upon it rapidly will be decisive. As a result, battlefield sensors
are being developed on scales from microscopic to aircraft-sized. At the
strategic level, the inability to sense public opinion may lead to a loss
of situational awareness, the widening of perception gaps, and finally,
frequent self-imposed strategic surprises.
To avoid such events, it would be wise to design polls, surveys, focus
groups, and red-team equivalents to map the ever-changing relationship
between government, people, and military. Had such mechanisms existed
between 2003 and 2007, the establishment may have been able to react to
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early signals of the gap between the public’s expectations for wounded
soldiers and the care that was provided. Eventually, technology might
be leveraged to include new techniques such as predictive analytics, big
data mining, simulation, and modeling.
As mentioned, the Army already implemented a solution for Walter
Reed. As the Defense Health Agency matures, the organization should
ensure it does not rebuild the system it was designed to replace. Costs
and readiness must be balanced with patient experiences and satisfaction
or history will repeat itself.
The events examined in this study depended on the creation
of the AVF. Specifically, abandoning the draft, over time, created a
largely anonymous force of tremendous agency and perceived altruistic
motivations. Forty-five years later, with the help of lessons drawn from
Walter Reed, we are beginning to understand the repercussions of an
AVF in American society. Specifically, the relationship between the
government, the public, and the AVF is such that the public elevates the
AVF by attributing superhero characteristics and status to it.
Such a status widens the gap between the all-volunteer force and
the establishment that governs it—framing civilian and military leaders
as self-serving and therefore below the force in character. The public
increasingly supports the highest care, protection, and treatment of
the AVF. The establishment’s proximity and insider knowledge limits
it from completely aligning its perceptions with the public—creating
blind spots and turbulent transitions.
Finally, the perception gap between the AVF and the agents of its
management will increasingly lead the public to intervene in the conduct
of war as standards for the treatment of servicemembers heighten.
Without indicators to forecast these phenomena, new constraints may
develop regarding the nation’s ability to employ its military.

